This paper explores the influence of labor market institutions on aggregate fluctuations. It uses a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model characterized by search and matching frictions in the labor market and nominal rigidities in the goods market. It finds that firing costs and unemployment benefits can have substantial effects on aggregate fluctuations. Increasing firing costs decreases the volatility of output, employment and job flows, due to the reduction of the mass of jobs sensitive to disturbances and lower incentives for firms to hire and fire workers. Hence, firms adjust to shocks mainly through prices, and inflation then becomes more volatile. Raising unemployment benefits has the reverse effect on aggregate fluctuations. JEL: E24, E32, E52, J64.
Introduction
Labor market institutions play an important role in the macroeconomic performance of an economy. 1 In principle, the structure of the labor market impacts on the long-run equilibrium of an economy and, therefore, the way in which macroeconomic aggregates fluctuate over time. The literature extensively focuses on the impact of labor market institutions on the underlying structural features of the economy, 2 but, as detailed below, only a few papers study their impact on business cycle fluctuations. Of those, none has used a general equilibrium search and matching model of the labor market, nor have any of them incorporated nominal rigidities in the analysis.
In this paper, we take on this task. Our main question is: how do labor market institutions affect aggregate fluctuations? To answer this question we employ a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model with search frictions in the labor market and nominal rigidities in the goods market. The use of a DSGE approach allows us to control for the effects of other possible factors that can affect aggregate dynamics, to isolate the effects of labor market institutions. We use a search framework in the labor market with endogenous job destruction as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) because for analyzing positive and normative questions about labor institutions, "we need a theory that includes reasons why people allocate time to a particular activity-like unemployment" as noted by Lucas (1987, p.50) . In this theoretical framework, equilibrium unemployment arises endogenously because workers and employers encounter frictions that limit their flows of meetings. We adopt nominal rigidities in the goods market because this enables us to investigate the impact of labor market institutions on the pricing decisions of firms and, hence, on inflation. Moreover, in this way, we can analyze the effect of nominal shocks on aggregate fluctuations.
We assess the quantitave implications of labor market institutions by studying the effects of unemployment benefits and firing costs. Unemployment benefits are modeled as payments that accrue to workers after separations, while firing costs are modeled as "firing taxes" that firms pay when a worker is dismissed. The choice of these particular labor market institutions is motivated by both empirical evidence and theoretical considerations. Empirically, Nickell 1 See Bertola et al. (2002) , Layard and Nickell (1999) , Nickell (1997) , and papers in Snower and de la Dehesa (1997) .
2 See the survey by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000, Ch. 9 ).
(1997) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) conclude that such institutions in practice have a statistically significant influence on labor market performance. On theoretical grounds, Pissarides (2000, Ch. 9) points out that these institutions are particularly relevant to explain structural features of the labor market. To make a quantitative assessment of how these labor market institutions impact on aggregate fluctuations, we calibrate our benchmark economy to UK data. We then compare the implications of our benchmark economy to a situation where firing costs and unemployment benefits increase from their benchmark calibration. For each of these changes we analyze the effects on the steady-state equilibrium and business cycle dynamics.
In this model, the rate of job destruction is sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks affecting the firms. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Davis, et al. (1996) . Here, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , in some of the cases in which firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, production is profitable, but in some others it is not. The firm chooses an equilibrium reservation productivity at which jobs become profitable and destroys jobs whose productivity falls below this threshold. Hence, the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is important in determining the job destruction rate and, consequently, the system dynamics.
Economic theory suggests that this distribution can be inferred by the distribution of the wage, because the latter should closely mimic the productivity of the job. Empirical evidence, first documented by Lydall (1968) and then by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) , suggests that the wage distribution exhibits three main features: a unique interior mode, skewness like a log-normal, and "fat" right tails of Pareto functional form. For this reason, here, as it is commonly assumed in the recent literature, idiosyncratic productivity shocks have a lognormal distribution. The main consequence of this choice is that, as documented below, since the equilibrium threshold is below the mode of the distribution, depending on how labor market institutions affect the threshold, the numbers of jobs vulnerable to destruction would either increase or decrease and this would serve either to magnify or suppress the effect of labor market institutions on aggregate fluctuations. Hence, we undertake a robustness analysis exercise to assess how the critical threshold and the shape of the distribution interact with firing costs and the replacement ratio to produce the results.
Our results suggest that an increase in firing costs decreases the volatility of output, unemployment, employment, and flows both in and out of employment, while the volatility of inflation, real wages and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, referred to as labor market tightness, all increase. The presence of firing costs affects the inter-temporal employment decision of firms, since an increase in current employment exposes firms to future firing costs.
This induces firms to decrease layoffs and hiring, leading to higher unemployment duration and lower unemployment incidence. The mass of jobs sensitive to deteriorations in the economy decreases and so disturbances displace a lower number of workers. Since quantities are more costly to change and disturbances affect a lower number of jobs, firms adjust to shocks through prices, changing them aggressively. Hence, inflation becomes more volatile.
An increase in unemployment benefits has the opposite effect. The volatility of output, unemployment, employment, and flows in and out of the labor market increases, while the volatility of inflation, real wages and labor market tightness decreases. Higher unemployment benefits make unemployment less painful for workers, causing the duration and flows into unemployment to increase. The mass of jobs sensitive to deteriorations in the economy increases, which amplifies the effect of shocks on labor quantities and output. Since a higher unemployment benefit forces firms to pay a higher reservation wage when employing a new worker, which suppress job creation, and means that shocks displace a larger number of jobs, the volatility of labor market quantities increases. Firms find it more convenient to adjust the employment level in response to shocks, so that they are less likely to adjust their prices in response to disturbances. As a result, inflation volatility decreases.
As mentioned earlier, much of the existing analysis of labor market institutions has tended to focus on their impact on the deterministic equilibrium of the economy, with the inflationary consequences largely ignored. Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) analyze the impact of different labor market institutions on the steady-state of unemployment and output. Similarly, Chari et al. (2005) build on the labor matching framework to study the connection between labor institutions and investment in training. Alvarez and Veracierto (1999) explore the extent to which labor market policies can explain differences in employment across economies using a Lucas-Prescott equilibrium search model. AlosoBorrego et al. (2005) evaluate specific labor market reforms such as temporary contracts and firing costs in a model with heterogeneous agents and labor search. Finally, Yashiv (2004) explores the consequences of macroeconomic policy for labor market outcomes in a partialequilibrium model. We extend this line of research to a general equilibrium setting with a more comprehensive structure of the labor market, that is capable of analyzing a broader set of dynamics. All these works limit their analysis to the deterministic equilibrium of the econ-omy, and they do not consider nominal variables such as inflation. In constrast, this paper computes the full-blown stochastic equilibrium and account for nominal variables. Veracierto (2005) performs a general equilibrium analysis of the effects of firing taxes on cyclical fluctuations. However, he employs a real business cycle model that does not incorporate labor frictions, nor does it account for either inflation dynamics or nominal disturbances. This paper allows for both these features so as to capture the more detailed dynamics of the labor market in the economy.
This paper is not the first work that combines a New Keynesian setting with search and matching frictions in the labor market. An increasing number of papers, such as Christoffel and Linzert (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007) , Trigari (2005) , and Walsh (2005) use the search framework to incorporate the labor market frictions into a monetary economy and find that those improve the ability of the standard New Keynesian framework to replicate the actually observed dynamics of unemployment and inflation. This paper uses a similar setting, but, unlike any of these works, incorporates labor market institutions and investigates their effect on aggregate fluctuations and, in particular, on inflation. Hence, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it extends the standard search and matching framework, by analyzing the effect of labor market institutions on aggregate fluctuations using a full-blown general equilibrium setting. Second, using a New Keynesian setting enriched with search and matching frictions, it explicitly focuses on labor market institutions and their influence on inflation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the economic environment, Section 3 sets up the model, Section 4 defines the equilibrium and presents the solution method, Section 5 describes the baseline calibration, Section 6 discusses the findings, and, finally, Section 7 concludes.
The Economic Environment
The model resembles those used by Krause and Lubik (2007) and Walsh (2005) , which embed the labor market specification of den Haan et al. (2000) into a New Keynesian setting.
This paper develops this framework by adding two specific labor market institutions: unemployment benefits and firing costs. The set-up describes the behaviour of a representative household, a production sector comprised of a representative goods-producing firm, a contin-uum of retail firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and a central bank.
During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., each representative goods-producing firm posts vacancies to recruit workers and, once the firm and worker agree on a specific wage contract, the firm produces a distinct, perishable good. During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., each retail firm purchases intermediate goods from a representative goods-producing firm and sells it at an established price on the market. The advantage of this modeling strategy for the goods market is that staggered price setting can be explicitly modeled in the retail market as in Calvo (1983) . 3 Alternatively, as in Krause and Lubik (2007) , we could have modelled staggered price setting as in Rotemberg (1983) , where firms face quadratic costs when changing nominal prices. The advantage of using a staggered price setting as in Calvo (1983) is that the parameter that controls the degree of nominal rigidities is linked to the number of periods that prices remain on average unchanged. In the Rotemberg approach, this parameter captures the general degree of nominal rigidities and, moreover, to make the model more realistic, is often calibrated to replicate the results in Calvo, so that the two approaches are observationally identical.
The labor market is based on den Haan et al. (2000), which build upon the standard search and matching framework, with endogenous job destruction as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . It relies on the assumption that the processes of job search and recruitment is time-consuming, and costly for both the representative goods-producing firm and worker. To capture this idea, a matching function describes the number of jobs formed at any moment in time as a function of the number of unemployed workers looking for a job, and the number of vacancies posted by firms. Job creation takes place when a firm and a searching worker meet and agree to form a match at a negotiated wage. The match continues until a negative idiosyncratic shock arrives or the parties exogenously decide to terminate the relationship.
When one of these events realize, job destruction takes place and the worker moves from employment to unemployment, and the representative goods-producing firm can either withdraw from the market or re-open a job as a new vacancy.
The central bank is modeled with a modified Taylor (1993) rule as in Clarida et al. (1998): it gradually adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to output and inflation deviations from their steady-state levels.
The next section formalizes these concepts.
3 A similar specification is proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) .
The Model
The number of job matches depends on the matching technology m(u t , v t ) where v t is the number of vacancies and u t is the number of workers searching for a job. Following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) , the maching technology assumes the form m(u t , v t ) = χu ξ t v 1−ξ t , where 0 < ξ < 1, and χ is a scale parameter. It is convenient to introduce the variable θ t = v t /u t , labor market tightness, so that the probability that a searching firm finds a worker is denoted
t , while the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job is denoted by p(θ t ) = m(u t , v t )/u t = χθ 1−ξ t . With this notation, the mean duration of a vacant job is 1/q(θ t ) and the mean duration of unemployment is 1/p(θ t ). During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the flow into unemployment results from an exogenous negative shock with probability ρ x , and from shocks to the idiosyncratic productivity of active jobs, a t , leading to an endogenous job destruction with probability ρ n t , when the idiosyncratic shock falls below some threshold, e a t . As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , we assume that new matches have an idiosyncratic productivity, a N t , that is always higher than e a t so that new matches are always productive and never separate. Total job separations are therefore
The idiosyncratic shock has a lognormal distribution with mean μ ln , and standard deviation σ 2 ln . When endogenous separation takes place, the firm incurs a firing cost, T . Given this setting, total employment for the representative goods-producing firm is n t = (1 − ρ t )n t−1 + m(u t−1 , v t−1 ).
The Representative Household
Members of the representative household can either work or be unemployed so that n t = 1−u t , where u t is the number of unemployed, and the labor force is normalized to one. During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the representative household maximizes an expected utility function of the form
where the variable C t is consumption, M t /P t is real money holdings, and β is the discount factor 0 < β < 1. To avoid distributional issues from heterogeneity, especially painful in presence of labor market institutions, we follow Mertz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) and B t bonds into period t + 1, subject to the budget constraint
for all t = 0, 1, 2, .... Thus the household chooses {C t , B t , M t } ∞ t=0 to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint (2) for all t = 0, 1, 2, .... Letting m t = M t /P t denote real money balances, π t = P t /P t−1 the gross inflation rate, and Λ t the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (2), the first order conditions for this problem are
and
where β t,t+1 = βΛ t+1 /Λ t is the stochastic discount factor. Equations (3) and (4), are standard
Euler equations and describe the optimal path for consumption and bonds respectively. 4
Let U t , W N t , and W t (a t ) denote the present-discounted value of the expected income of an unemployed, new employed, and continuing employed worker respectively. The unemployed worker enjoys a return b while unemployed, and expects to move into employment with probability p(θ t ). Hence, the present-discounted value of unemployment is
This equation states that the value of unemployment is made up of the yield b and the expected-discounted capital gain from the change of state. As in Pissarides (2000), we assume that b = h + ρ R w, where h represent value of leisure or home production, w the average wage at the steady-state, and ρ R the replacement ratio for unemployment benefits. We assume that 0 < ρ R < 1. Note that although the replacement ratio is linked to the average wage in steadystate, to keep the setting simple, it is time-invariant and is financed through non-distortionary taxes. If taxes were distortionary, this would alter the agents' optimal employment decisions and introduce an additional channel of departure from the standard model. The detailed investigation of this is left open for future research.
The employed worker earns a wage and may lose her job with probability ρ t . Due to the presence of firing costs, the wage offered by the firm for new hires, w N t , differs from the one offered to continuing matches, w t (a t ). In this way, if a new match is immediately dismissed, the firm does not have the burden of firing costs. Hence, the present-discounted values of a new match, W N t , and of a continuing job, W t (a t ), are not necessarily the same, and are:
Equations (6) and (7) state that the value of a job for a worker is given by the wage and the expected-discounted net gain from continuing to work.
The Goods market
As described above, the production sector is comprised of a representative goods-producing firm, and a continuum of retail firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], characterized by staggered price setting as in Calvo (1983) .
The representative goods-producing firm
During each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., each representative goods-producing firm posts vacancies at a cost c to recruit a new worker and faces an idiosyncratic job-specific shock, a t , and a common productivity disturbance, A t , on established jobs. If the idiosyncratic shock is below some threshold, e a t , the match becomes unprofitable and vanishes. If the match continues, production occurs with an output of y t = A t a t . The productivity shock follows the autoregressive process ln(A t ) = ρ A ln(A t−1 ) + ε At , with 0 < ρ A < 1, where the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation ε At is normally distributed with standard deviation σ 2 A . Let V t denote the present-discounted value of expected profits from a vacant job. Hence, the present value of a vacancy is
This equation states that a vacant job costs c and becomes filled with a probability of q(θ t ) with a return J N t+1 , and with a probability of 1 − q(θ t ) with a return V t+1 . Once a worker has been hired, the present-discounted value of a new match to the em-
where t is the real value of a unit of output, which is equivalent to the real marginal cost for the representative retail firm. Similarly, the present-discounted value of a continuing job to the employer, J t (a t ), is
Equations (9) and (10) state that the value of a new match yields a net return t A t a t − w t (a t ) and a present-discounted net value J t+1 (a t+1 ) − F (ã t+1 )T , if the job is not destroyed.
Wage Setting
The structure of the model guarantees that a realized job match yields some pure economic surplus. The share of this surplus between the worker and the firm is determined by the wage level, in addition to compensating each side for its costs from forming the job. As in Pissarides (2000), the wage is set according to the Nash bargaining solution. Note that the standard implicit assumption to this setting is that wages are bargained in every period, so that they are closely linked to current productivity, both at the individual and aggregate level. This may appear to be incongruous with the assumption that, on average, prices are not allowed to change in each period, as detailed below. It would probably be more realistic to incorporate some degree of wage stickiness in the model, as recently advocated by Gertler and Trigari (2006) . Here, in order to keep as simple and standard a theoretical framework as possible, we leave the investigation of this issue open for future research. The worker and the firm split the surplus of their matches with share 0 < η < 1. Since the wage is match-specific, depending on the idiosyncratic productivity of the job, the wage bargaining rule for continuing matches and new matches are respectively
As the job idiosyncratic productivity of new jobs is always higher than the threshold, firing costs do not appear in the second equation. We undertake this assumption because it is more realistic, as otherwise firms might pay firing costs for workers just employed but whose productivity is below the equilibrium threshold, even before these workers produce any goods.
Moreover, since the proportion of new hires is small compared to the incumbent workers, as detailed below, this result does not significantly affect the dynamics of the average wage and, hence, the overall results. Hence, using equations (5)- (10), the agreed wage for continuing, w t (a t ), and new workers, w N t , are
where ζ t = E t β t,t+1 (1 − ρ x ). Equations (11) and (12) state that workers receive a wage made up of two parts. First, for a fraction η, from the revenue product generated, t A t a t , a reward for the saving of hiring costs, cθ t , a charge for the future expected firing costs in both cases, ζ t T , and a compensation for the saving of firing costs, T , in the case of continuing workers. Second, for a fraction 1−η, from the real return of unemployment, b. Note that here firing costs, T , do not appear in the wage for newly hired workers because their idiosyncratic productivity is always above the equilibrium productivity threshold, such that new workers are never fired in the same period in which they are first employed and, therefore, firms will never pay firing costs for them. Furthermore, firing costs are assumed to be a sunk cost and not a transfer to the worker. This assumption is important because, as pointed out by Lazear (1990) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , and Ljungquist (2002), any mandated severance transfer can be offset by an efficient labor contract and, hence, there would be no real effects.
Thus, to study the effect of firing costs we need to model them as a sunk cost. A similar assumption is undertaken by Thomas (2006) where firing costs do not appear in the new hire's wage and whose findings closely accord with those here.
The Retail Sector
During each period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the representative retail firm uses Y t (i) units of each intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1], purchased at the nominal price P t (i), to manufacture Y t units of the finished good according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology described by
where γ is the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
The firm acts to maximize its profits; the first-order conditions for this problem are
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2, .... Competition drives the goods-producing firm's profits to zero in equilibrium, determining P t as
for all t = 0, 1, 2, .... The representative retail firm sets prices as in Calvo (1983) . During each period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., a fraction (1 − ν) of retail firms sets a new price, while the remaining fraction ν charges the previous period's price time steady-state inflation. The probability of a price change is constant over time and independent of the firm's price history. Hence, firm i that sets a new price P t (i) in time t maximizes
where β j t,t+1 is the rate at which the firm discounts its earnings at time t + j, and t is the real marginal cost. First-order conditions for this problem are
A formal definition of the real marginal cost, t , can be derived from equation (8)- (10).
By solving explicitly for the real value of a unit of output we obtain:
.
From this equation, the real marginal cost is equal to the wage, plus the expected discounted benefit of a worker, plus the foregone costs in not having to hire a new worker, divided by the marginal product of labor. Since here the value of the job is different for new and existing workers, the foregone costs also include the wage to be paid to new matches, w N t , and the marginal product of labor is adjusted for the foregone contribution of newly hired workers, a N t .
The Central Bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy using a modified Taylor (1993) rule,
where R, Y , and π are the steady-state values of the nominal interest rate, output, and gross inflation rate respectively. According to equation (16), the central bank gradually adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to movements in output and inflation. The zero-mean, serially uncorrelated policy shock ε rt is normally distributed with a standard deviation σ 2 r . As pointed out in Clarida et al. (1998) and Nelson (2003) , this modelling strategy for the central bank is broadly consistent with actual monetary policy for the United Kingdom since the early Nineties.
Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric, dynamic, equilibrium all retail firms make identical decisions, so that P t (i) = P t . In equilibrium, free entry drives the profit from an open vacancy to zero, so that V t = 0.
This combined with equations (8), (9), and (12) yields the job creation condition
In equilibrium, jobs are destroyed when the surplus that the firm receives from the job, J t (a t ) + T , falls below zero. The variableã t is the threshold of the idiosyncratic shock below which a job is not profitable, that is J t (e a t ) + T = 0. This combined with equations (10) and (11) yields the job destruction condition
In equilibrium, the average wage, w t , is a weighted average of equations (11) and (12) with weights ω C t = (1 − ρ t )n t−1 /n t for continuing workers, and 1 − ω C t for new matches so that
is the average idiosyncratic productivity across jobs, and H(ã t ) = E(a t |a t >ã t ) is the average productivity for continuing jobs. In equilibrium, the aggregate income is y t = n t A tāt − cv t , B t = B t+1 = 0, and τ t = M t − M t−1 . As pointed out above, since the proportion of new jobs is small compared to that of incumbent workers, the assumption that new jobs start with a productivity higher than the equilibrium threshold does not significantly affect the results of the model. Hence the overall dynamics ofā t is driven by the idiosyncratic productivity of continuing jobs.
The equilibrium is described by the evolution of employment, total job separation, labor market tightness, the definition of employed workers, equations (3) and (4), the return from employment, the definition of the stochastic discount factor, equations (14)- (19), the specification of the shocks, and the aggregate income. The system is approximated by loglinearizing its equations around the stationary steady-state. In this way, a linear dynamic system describes the path of the endogenous variables' relative deviations from their steadystate value, accounting for the exogenous shocks. The solution to this system is derived using Klein (2000) , which is a modification of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) .
Calibration
The benchmark economy is calibrated to reproduce the structural characteristics of the UK economy for the period 1980:Q1 -2005:Q3. We calibrate the model on quarterly frequencies and the value for each parameter is reported as follows. We set the discount factor, β, equal to 0.99, which implies an annual steady-state real interest rate of 4%. The coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, equals 2 as in King and Rebelo (2000) .
The steady-state unemployment rate is set to 4.5%. We set the steady-state separation rate ρ = 0.02. These two parameters pin down the probability that an unemployed worker will find a job in any given period, p = ρ(1−u)/u, equal to 0.6. These values are consistent for the UK economy, as suggested in Burgess and Turon (2005) . Following the evidence in Bell and Smith (2002), we impose an exogenous job destruction rate of ρ x = 0.01. Consequently, the endogenous separation rate can be computed as ρ n = (ρ − ρ x )/(1 − ρ x ) = 0.005. The implied reservation productivity threshold is e a = F −1 (ρ n ) = 0.77. Following the standard assumption in the literature, as in den Haan et al. (2000), we assume that idiosyncratic productivity, e a, is lognormal and i.i.d., with c.d.f. F (·). We calibrate the value for the mean of F (·), μ ln , equal to zero, and the value of its standard deviation, σ ln , equal to 0.1. Similar values are used in Burgess and Turon (2005) . We assume that the idiosyncratic productivity for new matches is always in the 95th percentile of F (·), so that a N > e a and new matches never separate.
As in Burgess and Turon (2005) , we set the firm matching rate q(θ) = 0.9. The match elasticity, ξ, is calibrated to 0.7, based on the empirical estimates in Bean (1994) . The level parameter of the matching function, χ, is computed using the fact that the steady-state number of matches is ρ(1 − u). As it is standard in the literature, we calibrate the worker's share parameter, η, to 0.5, so that the household and the firm have the same bargaining power.
The vacancy posting cost, c, and unemployment benefits, b, are inferred from the steady-state job creation and job destruction conditions respectively. Hence, the parameter for value of leisure, h, is calibrated accordingly to 0.59. This is broadly consistent with Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) . Firing costs, T , and the replacement ratio, ρ R , amount to 30% of the mean wage. These values are similar to those found in the UK economy in Bean (1994) and Nickell (1997) .
We set the parameter γ, which measures the degree of market power of firms in the retail sector, equal to 11. Since the steady-state value of γ determines the mark-up of prices over marginal costs, this value implies a mark-up of 10% which is in line with that suggested in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) . We set the parameter ν equal to 0.75, such that the average contract length is four quarters, as in Taylor (1999) . Therefore, the elasticity of inflation with respect to marginal costs is κ = (1 − ν)(1 − νβ)/ν = 0.09. As in Krause and Lubik (2007) , we set the value for steady-state gross inflation, π, equal to 1.
We calibrate the parameters of the monetary policy rule using Taylor (1999) and Nelson (2003) . In particular, the interest rate response to inflation, ρ π , is set equal to 1.5, the interest rate response to output, ρ y , equals 0.5, and the degree of interest rate smoothing, ρ r , is set equal to 0.32.
Finally, we calibrate the shock processes. The value of the standard deviation of the policy shock is in line with Clarida et al. (1998) , who estimate a similar specification for this shock with the generalized method of moments for the UK. Its standard deviation, σ r , equals 0.0012. In line with most of the literature, we set the serial correlation for the technology shock, ρ A , equal to 0.94. Following the common practice in the literature, 5 we calibrate the innovation variance such that the baseline model predictions replicate the standard deviation of output, which is 1.08%. Consequently, the standard deviation of the technology shock, σ A , equals 0.003.
Findings
This section is divided into four parts: first, we describe the changes labor market institutions produce in the model steady-state; second, we analyze the model's impulse responses to demand and supply shocks; third, we simulate the model in order to determine the effects of firing costs and the replacement ratio on business cycle dynamics; and, finally, we undertake a robustness analysis exercise.
Steady-State Analysis
The third column of Table 1 shows the effects of increasing the replacement ratio by 5 percentage points, from 30% to 35%. An increase in the replacement ratio increases the relative value of the unemployment option to workers so that the average wage, specified by equation (19), increases from 0.91 to 0.92. The increase in the replacement ratio generates an upwards shift in the job destruction relation, as expressed in equation (18) and represented in Figure 1 . Since the job creation condition, as in equation (17), is not affected, the equilibrium reservation productivity rises so as to increase the endogenous job-separation rate.
As the increase in reservation productivity induces a movement up along the job creation schedule in the figure, the equilibrium job-finding rate, as reflected in labor market tightness, is adversely affected. Consequently, unemployment duration increases and job flows in and out of employment decline. The unemployment rate is the product of both the flows into unemployment and unemployment duration; hence the increase in both unambiguously raises the unemployment rate. Quantitatively, the equilibrium productivity threshold increases by around 3%, causing the rate of endogenous job destruction to increase from 0.5% to 0.9% and, similarly, the overall rate of job destruction rises from 1.5% to 1.9%. The unemployment rate increases from 4.5% to 5.5% and, conversely, vacancies decline by around 7%.
The fourth column of Table 1 shows the effects of increasing firing costs by 5 percentage points, from 30% to 35%. An increase in firing costs has an opposite effect on the job destruction relation as an increase in the replacement ratio. As depicted in Figure 2 , the increase in firing costs also raises future profitability given reservation productivity, so that the job creation schedule, as specified in equation (17), shifts left. At the same time, the job destruction condition, as in equation (18), shifts downwards. The equilibrium productivity threshold unambiguously declines, and also labor market tightness decreases. The reduction of labor market tightness increases unemployment duration, while job flows decrease. In our calibration, the second effect dominates so that the unemployment rate decreases. Quantitatively, equilibrium labor market tightness decreases by around 9% and, similarly, the equilibrium reservation productivity by around 8%. As a consequence, the endogenous job destruction rate decreases from 0.5% to 0.2% and, similarly, the rate of total job destruction falls from 1.5% to 1.2%. Both the decrease in the job-destruction rate and the lower duration of unemployment leads to a fall in the unemployment rate, from 4.5% to 3.4% and, similarly, vacancies by around 4%. Overall, these findings show that an expansion of labor market institutions in the form of either firing costs or unemployment benefits have a reverse effect on the mean levels around which the economy fluctuates.
As a final exercise in this section, the last column of Table 1 shows the effects of increasing both the replacement ratio and firing costs by 5 percentage points, from 30% to 35%. As a result, the job creation condition shifts left, due to the increase in firing costs. In principle, the job destruction condition could change either way, as these institutions shift the schedule in opposite directions. Effectively, the job destruction schedule shifts downwards, since the effect from the increase in firing costs dominates that from the increase in the replacement ratio.
As a result, equilibrium labour market tightness decreases by around 9%, and equilibrium reservation productivity by around 7%. These changes trigger a decrease in the rate of endogenous and total job destruction from 0.5% to 0.1% and from 1.5% to 1.1% respectively.
The unemployment rate decreases from 4.5% to 4.2%, while output increases by around 1%.
This exercise suggests that for a similar increase in the replacement ratio and firing costs, the latter leads the job destruction condition to react such that it shapes the equilibrium of the economy.
Impulse Response Analysis
This section discusses the impulse responses to technology and monetary shocks for the benchmark calibration of the model. Figure 3 shows the model's response to a one percentage point technology shock. On impact, inflation declines, and output and employment rise, followed by a pronounced hump-shaped adjustment path. Higher productivity leads to an increase in real wages, while real marginal costs rise on impact and then decline back to the initial equilibrium. Vacancies increase, unemployment falls both leading to a rise in labor market tightness, and then return gently to equilibrium. A rise in labor market tightness depresses the probability of filling vacancies and this leads to a smooth decline in flows into employment.
Flows out of employment fall on impact due to the substantial decrease in the endogenous job destruction rate caused by a fall in reservation productivity. Figure 4 shows the model's response to a one percentage point nominal interest rate shock. Output, employment and inflation all fall, before returning to their steady-state levels.
Employment decreases proportionally more than output since the rise in the critical threshold for the idiosyncratic productivity rate makes some formerly profitable firm-worker matches now unprofitable. Real wages and marginal costs fall on impact, then quickly return to their steady-state levels. Labor market tightness increases due to a higher increase in vacancies than in unemployment. This is in contrast with the data, as discussed in the next section.
It results from a large increase in separations, which is reflected in the behaviour of the job destruction rate. In fact, firms tend to reduce employment by destroying more jobs, even more productive ones, rather then reducing the rate at which jobs are created. In general, the effect of a nominal interest rate shock dies out more quickly than that of a productivity shock. This is because the disturbance is serially uncorrelated and the smoothing parameter, ρ r , in the modified Taylor rule is small.
At this point, it is important to note that in the model changes in firing costs and the replacement ratio have no strong qualitative effects on the way shocks propagate. Nonetheless, they have a significant quantitative effect on the amplification of disturbances; this is evaluated in the next section.
Business Cycle Dynamics
This section analyzes the effects of changes in firing costs and the replacement ratio on business cycle dynamics. First, we determine the empirical plausibility of business cycles generated by the benchmark calibration of the model. Then, we evaluate the effects of an increase in firing costs and in the replacement ratio on business cycle dynamics.
Before examining the performance of the model when both shocks are considered, Table   2 evaluates the volatility of the variables in the model conditional on each of the two shocks at a time. In this way, we can establish the contribution that each disturbance makes to the model dynamics. When we condition the model on technology shocks, the volatility of the variables becomes close to that in the data, and higher than in the case of using nominal interest rate shocks only. Instead, when we condition the model on interest rate shocks, the size of the volatility of the variables is substantially lower than that in the data.
The third column of Table 3 considers the behavior of the benchmark calibration of the model under both shocks. Since the volatility of the variables induced by nominal shocks is small compared to technology shocks, the behavior of the two shocks combined is dominated by the latter. Despite this, we find that the volatility is much closer now to the data than when only one type of shock is considered. In general, compared to the data, the volatility of the variables is of a smaller magnitude. The benchmark calibration of the model performs well in capturing the relative volatility of the data. The values are somewhat lower than that in the data, but remarkably close. The next step is to assess the contemporaneous cross-correlations reported in the table.
An established aggregate labor market fact is that real wages are only slightly pro-cyclical. This is difficult to reconcile with a neoclassical labor market where wages are determined by their marginal productivity which is highly correlated with output. As pointed out in Krause and Lubik (2007) , the search and matching framework breaks this relationship because wages share the surplus of an employment relationship. However, our simulated value of 0.42 is still higher than the correlation of 0.25 that we find between output and real wages in the data.
Wages are still too pro-cyclical. The observed negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, -0.53 in the data, is broadly captured by the model though at a lower magnitude, -0.07. Next, we consider the behavior of inflation. Empirically, inflation has a negative correlation with output of -0.25, and its correlation with real wages is -0.42. In the model, inflation and output are negatively correlated at -0.9, while the correlation between inflation and the real wage is -0.27, close to the data. Some conclusions can be drawn at this point. On the one hand, in general, the baseline model mimics reasonably well the variables' volatility, and both the correlation of wages with output and inflation, and the correlation of inflation with output. On the other hand, the model fails to account for the correlations of vacancies with unemployment.
Before focusing on the effect of firing costs and unemployment benefit on the dynamics of the system, we need to ask what makes the model perform somewhat differently from Krause and Lubik (2007) . This is particularly important in order to isolate the contribution of firing costs and unemployment benefit. The model departs from Krause and Lubik's (2007) setting in three aspects: first, as mentioned, by using Calvo's price setting rule instead of quadratic adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) , second, by using an interest rate rule rather then a money growth rule, and, finally, through the presence of labor firing costs.
The Calvo price setting mechanism is not responsible for this difference, since the stickiness parameter in the quadratic adjustment costs formulation can be calibrated such that the two approaches produce observationally equivalent results. Similarly, as Krause and Lubik (2007) point out, if we had used a money supply process instead of an interest rate rule, the results would be similar, since these two approaches are virtually identical. Hence, what makes the model perform differently from that of Krause and Lubik (2007) is the presence of firing costs. For instance, one striking difference in the performance of the model is the lack of correlation between unemployment and vacancies, which is close to zero, instead of being strongly positive as in Krause and Lubik (2007) . Here the absence of correlation can be explained by the presence of firing costs. An increase in firing costs decreases the surplus that the firm receives from a new job and, hence, as from equation (17), causes vacancies to react to shocks less than unemployment, generating a less positive, and in this case close to zero, correlation between these variables. Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) suggest that having a small expected payoff generates a proper reaction of vacancies to shocks, which is in line with the effect that firing costs have in this model. Furthermore, Thomas (2006) shows similar findings in the context of a real business cycle model that accounts for firing costs.
We can now analyze how changes in firing costs and the replacement ratio affect business cycle dynamics. The fourth column of Table 3 shows business cycle statistics of the variables when firing costs increase by 5 percentage points, from 30% to 35%. The standard deviation of output decreases together with those of employment, unemployment, flows into and out of employment, while those of vacancies, labor market tightness, real wages, and inflation increase. The same findings hold for the relative standard deviation of the variables. The variables volatility of inflation and real wages increases as a result of firing costs. Why does it happen? The behaviour of the equilibrium productivity threshold plays a key role in the explanation. As firing costs increase, the equilibrium productivity threshold decreases, as described previously, so that the number of jobs sensitive to a deterioration in the economy is lower. Figure 5 plots the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity value a, along with the zero surplus level, e a. The figure captures the fact that the mass of jobs sensitive to deterioration decreases. Shocks would displace fewer jobs and this would immediately translate into lower volatility of flows out of employment. Firing costs affect the inter-temporal employment decision of the firm, since increasing current employment exposes the firm to future firing costs. It becomes more expensive for the firm to hire or fire workers; the firm relies on voluntary quits rather than firings to reduce its labor force. It continues to post vacancies, many of which would not be filled so that their volatility increases. At the same time, the volatility of output, employment, unemployment, flows in and out of employment decreases. Real wages become more volatile because an increase in firing costs amplifies the impact of the changes in the proportion of continuing workers on the average wage, as can be seen from equation (19). As real wages and, thus, marginal costs become more volatile so also inflation displays higher volatility. Real wages remain slightly pro-cyclical, with a correlation to output of 0.20, closer to the data compared to the benchmark model. Since firing costs affect output and inflation in an opposite way, their correlation decreases substantially, and becomes closer to the data. The negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment slightly increases.
The fifth column of Table 3 shows the business cycle statistics of the variables when the replacement ratio increases by 5 percentage points, from 30% to 35%. The standard deviation of output increases together with those of employment, unemployment, flows in and out of employment, while those of real wages, and inflation decrease. These results are the opposite to the ones an increase in firing costs produces. The key mechanism at work is again the response of equilibrium reservation productivity to a change in unemployment benefits. In this instance, the productivity threshold increases, which increases the mass of jobs affected by shocks. Hence disturbances would displace a higher number of jobs so that the volatility of flows out of employment increases. A higher replacement ratio gives incentives to workers to leave employment and not to search as long as they are eligible for unemployment benefits. Hence, the volatility of flows in employment, and unemployment increases. From equation (19), a higher replacement ratio does not affect the volatility of real wages, which indeed decreases, due to the decline in the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock and labor market tightness. Real wages remain slightly pro-cyclical, they have a correlation with output of 0.40, closer to the data compared to the benchmark model. The correlation between output and inflation remains substantially unchanged. The correlation between vacancies and unemployment continues to be negative but closer to zero, lower than in the benchmark model. The correlation between wages and output decreases to 0.40, closer to the one in the data. Finally, the correlation between wages and inflation increases to -0.36, closer to the data.
The last column of Table 3 shows the effect of increasing both the replacement ratio and firing costs of 5 percentage points, from 30% to 35%. Consistent with the steady-state analysis, where the effect of firing costs is more significant than unemployment benefit in determining the equilibrium of the economy, the changes in volatilities from the benchmark calibration of the model are qualitatively closer to the case of an increase in firing costs.
Robustness Analysis
The results presented above clearly depend on the structure of the model and, in particular, on the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Although we would argue that the choice for the log-normal distribution and its baseline calibration are a focal point because grounded by empirical evidence, as first documented by Lydall (1968) and then by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) , it is nevertheless important to recognize that, in principle, other calibrations and distributions may affect the way in which labor market institutions affect aggregate fluctuations. We therefore investigate the robustness of the results with respect to alternative calibrations of the baseline log-normal distribution, as well as changes of the distribution itself.
We consider alternative parameter choices that are of particular interest. First, since our calibration for the standard deviation of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks, σ ln , equals to 0.1 can be considered as a lower bound, given other parameterization used in the literature, we experiment with calibrations of this parameter for values of 0.13, as in Walsh (2005), and 0.4, as estimated in Trigari (2005) . An increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks moves the mode of the distribution to the left, increases the positive skewness of the distribution, and enlarges the "fat" right tail of the Pareto functional form. This is shown in Figure 6 , where we compare a calibration of σ ln = 0.1, as in the benchmark model, with σ ln = 0.4. In this model, a change in the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks also changes the critical threshold at which jobs are destroyed and, hence, the endogenous job destruction rate. In particular, an increase in the variance of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks decreases the equilibrium productivity threshold, which reduces the rate of endogenous separation. Table 4 presents the standard deviations of the variables under these new calibrations so as to quantify, similarly to the previous analysis, how changes in firing costs and the replacement ratio affect the business cycle dynamics, for different shapes of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. Note that, since the standard deviation of the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks is the only parameter that changes in the exercise, the benchmark calibration for the cases of σ ln equals to 0.13 and 0.4 is different from that in which σ ln equals to 0.1. Nonetheless, because increasing the variance of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks shifts the equilibrium productivity threshold to the left, and keeps it below the mode of the distribution, the underlying qualitative results of the previous analysis remain unchanged. Depending on how firing costs and the replacement ratio move the equilibrium productivity threshold, the variables would display different magnitudes of volatilities, but they would remain qualitatively in line with previous analyses. For instance, for both calibrations, increasing firing costs decreases the volatility of output, while increasing that of inflation, and the reverse occurs for an increase in the replacement ratio. Of course the magnitude of the fluctuations is different because now, since a higher σ ln decreases the equilibrium productivity threshold, aggregate shocks would displace fewer jobs and this dampens the impact of labor market institutions have on aggregate fluctuations. Therefore, a calibration of σ ln equal to 0.4 produces lower variable volatility overall than the case of when σ ln is equal to 0.13. Although the quantitative results differ from the benchmark case, the qualitative similarities between this section and the previous one suggest that the main results hold for different calibrations of the log-normal distribution.
As pointed out above, the assumption of a log-normal distribution may play an important role in the nature of the qualitative results. As a final robustness check, we assess whether the choice of a different distribution significantly affect our results. To this end, we simulate the model assuming that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks have a uniform distribution, as in earlier works on this topic. The main feature of this distribution is that each value of the state has the same probability of occurrence and, hence, in the context of a search model, the number of marginal jobs sensitive to separation is constant for different equilibrium productivity thresholds. Using a uniform distribution, we can sort out how the shape of the distribution interacts with firing costs and the replacement ratio to generate the results. In order to produce outcomes comparable with the previous analysis, we calibrate the uniform distribution so that it produces the same steady-state as the benchmark calibration. For this reason, the lower bound of the distribution is set equal to 0.7, and the upper bound equal to 1. In this way, the equilibrium productivity threshold is equal to 0.77, and the system has the same steady-state as the benchmark calibration. Also in this instance, an increase in firing costs decreases the equilibrium productivity threshold, while a raise in the replacement ratio increases it. Table 5 presents the standard deviations of the variables for the benchmark calibration under a uniform distribution together with the effect of increasing in turn firing costs and the replacement ratio. As expected, for benchmark values of firing costs and unemployment benefit, as represented in the second column of the Table, the model displays the same standard deviations as the benchmark calibration under a log-normal distribution since it has the same steady-state. On the other hand, once we increase firing costs and unemployment benefit in turn, the quantitative nature of the results differs from the benchmark calibration under a log-normal distribution. Nonetheless, the qualitative nature of the results under a log-normal distribution is preserved. For instance, increasing firing costs decreases the volatility of output, while increasing that of inflation, and the reverse occurs for an increase in the replacement ratio.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effect of labor market institutions on aggregate fluctuations. The analysis focused on firing costs and unemployment benefits in a DSGE framework characterized by search and matching frictions in the labor market and nominal rigidities in the goods market. Labor market institutions have a significant effect on the structural features of an economy. Changes in labor market institutions alter the deep structure of the economy and, hence, the way it reacts to disturbances. Firing costs lower the response of output, employment and job flows, while increasing that of inflation. Unemployment benefits produce the reverse effect. It must be noted that the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks that firms face is important. Here, in line with empirical evidence and previous theoretical studies, the distribution is log-normal. Its calibration, as determined by robustness analysis, is important in determining the precise quantitative effect of firing costs and unemployment benefits on aggregate fluctuations. Nonetheless, the qualitative results continue to hold for different calibrations of the log-normal distribution.
Since firing costs and unemployment benefits affect the volatility of output and inflation, they may have a non-trivial effect on the actions that a welfare-maximizing monetary poli-cymaker should undertake. As each labor market institution has an opposite effect on these variables, and, moreover, since the two institutions together affect the volatility of the variable in opposite directions, it is difficult to assess their implication for optimal monetary policy without performing a formal evaluation exercise. We leave the investigation of this topic open for future research.
But while the results do lead support to the importance of labor market institutions for business cycle dynamics, it should also be noted that, as the empirical evidence in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) points out, the combined interaction of disturbances and labor market institutions may have a non-trivial impact on aggregate fluctuations. Although the model developed here allows aggregate productivity and nominal disturbances to have effects on the economy, in practice, a variety of other aggregate shocks may play a role. The inclusion of additional disturbances and the study of the interaction between labor market institutions and a broader set of aggregate shocks remain outstanding tasks for future research.
Appendix A: Data Description
The labor market data that we use to present the stylized facts in this paper come from two main sources: Labour Market Trends and the Labour Force Survey, both published by the Office for National Statistics. All data is for the United Kingdom, and is seasonally adjusted. Bell and Smith (2002) . Output is measured by gross domestic product excluding oil and gas extraction. Inflation is the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index compared with the same month one year previously.
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